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Do Unions Promote Gender Equality? 
 
LILACH LURIE* 
“Many of the traditional regulations of the employment relationship no 
longer correspond to the real social and economic situation or to the la-
bour market.” 
[Marco Biagi, Italy, in PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES 267, 267 (Roger 
Blanpain ed., 1999)] 
 
Do workers’ unions promote gender equality? The scholarship in the past thirty 
years has increasingly questioned the ability of unions to give voice to the needs of all 
workers, including foreign workers, workers with disabilities, elderly workers, gay and 
lesbian workers, and women. This article shows that unions promote a patriarchal divi-
sion of labor in society through an empirical study of most of the sectorial collective 
agreements with employers in Israel. The fathers’ role in these collective agreements is to 
support their family; the mothers’ role is to raise the children. Thus several collective 
agreements provide mothers with flexible working hours and reimbursements for day-
care centers, while not providing these rights to working fathers. Significant collective 
agreements grant working fathers, but not working mothers, with a special “family sup-
plement” that is added to their monthly wages, increasing the gender wage-gap. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Almost thirty years have passed since Richard Freeman and James Medoff 
first asked “[w]hat do unions do?”1 In their highly influential book, Freeman and 
Medoff challenged the traditional view that unions only create monopolies that 
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  1.   RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES  L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984).  
Macro_Lurie_JCI (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2015 3:11 PM 
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 22:89 2014 
lead to exaggerated wages and inefficiencies. They claimed instead that unions 
have two faces: “monopoly” and “voice.” Unions play an important role in 
“voicing” workers’ needs and desires to the management. Freeman and Medoff 
followed Albert O. Hirschman’s view in “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” emphasizing 
the importance of “voice” in maintaining stability and preventing employment 
turnover.2 While an individual employee might fear altering his employer to his 
needs, unions have the ability to voice workers’ collective needs.3 
Following Freeman and Medoff, many researchers accepted unions’ role as 
voicing workers’ needs. Yet researchers also raised questions: Whose voice do 
unions represent? Is it the voice of all the workers or only some of them? Groups 
such as women, foreign workers, workers with disabilities, elderly workers, gay 
and lesbian workers—are their voices heard? Do unions promote equality and 
diversity? 
The present research contributes to the current debate by looking at the re-
sults of collective agreements and negotiations in Israel from the perspective of 
gender. This paper is based on an empirical study of most of Israel’s sectorial col-
lective agreements in the private and public sectors. This paper shows that col-
lective agreements (and unions) do, in fact, promote a patriarchal division of la-
bor. Several collective agreements provide mothers with flexible working hours 
and reimbursements for day-care centers. Working fathers are generally not enti-
tled to these rights. Instead, their role is to financially support the family. There-
fore working fathers—but not working mothers—are entitled to special “family 
supplement[s]” that are added to their monthly wages. The result of this empiri-
cal research reaffirms literature claiming that unions tend to represent the ‘medi-
an’ worker and under-represent ‘outsiders’ and workers in precarious fields. 
In the past few decades, feminist scholars took part in a debate regarding 
several questions: What is considered a “women’s interest”? What is considered 
“gender equality”? What are the best ways to promote gender equality?4 While 
feminist scholars from the “first wave of feminism” who struggled for “formal 
gender equality” emphasized the similarities between men and women, as well 
as those between one woman and another, feminist scholars from the “second 
wave” emphasized the differences. Furthermore, while “first wave” feminists 
struggled for women’s right to vote and women’s right for equal pay, “second 
wave” feminists struggled for “maternity leave” and “affirmative action.”5 In her 
influential book, In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan, a “second wave” feminist, 
 
  2.   ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).  
  3.   FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1.  
  4.   Cf. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Gender Equality and Labor Movements: Toward a Global Perspective, 5–
7, 41–48 (2012), http://www.solidaritycenter.org/Files/Rutgers%20‐
%20Gender%20Equality%20and%20Labor%20Movements.pdf (reviewing research on gender equali‐
ty and labor movements to highlight best practices); Catherine Hakim, Lifestyle preferences as determi‐
nants of women’s differentiated labour market careers, 29 WORK & OCCUPATIONS  (824 2002) (discussing a 
1999 national survey in Britain that confirms that women’s lifestyle preferences no longer determine 
occupational choice); Kathleen Kelly Janus, Finding Common Feminist Ground: The Role of the Next Gen‐
eration in Shaping Feminist Legal Theory, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255 (2013).  
  5.   Cobble, supra note 4; Janus, supra note 4. 
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wrote about the genuine differences between men and women.6 Women, as op-
posed to men, are more subject to dilemmas regarding care.7 Following Gilligan, 
cultural feminists claimed that women should be compensated for their familial 
care responsibilities.8 Moreover, second and third wave feminists called for “sub-
stantive equality” or “gender mainstreaming” as opposed to the “first wave” call 
for equal opportunities.9 Several feminist scholars emphasized the diverse inter-
ests between women themselves.10 Every type of feminism described broadly 
above leads to a different understanding of “gender equality” and the ways to 
achieve it. Nonetheless, these important differences between the different types 
of feminism fade for the purposes of this article. The collective agreements exam-
ined herein infringe on gender equality however one may define it: formally, 
substantively, or otherwise. 
 
I. METHODOLOGY 
 
The empirical research consisted of a study of all collective agreement pro-
visions that grant rights based on gender (only to men or only to women). The 
collective agreements examined are listed below. I also included in the research 
provisions granting rights based on parenthood (only to fathers or only to moth-
ers). 
More specifically, the research focused on provisions granting three main 
rights on the basis of gender: first, a right for a family supplement; second, a 
right to work reduced working hours; and third, a right to a day-care subsidy. 
The first step was to mark these provisions. The second step was to ascertain 
whether these provisions apply only to female workers, only to male workers, or 
to all employees. 
The research includes almost all Israeli sectorial collective agreements: 56 
agreements in total. 18 of these were public sector agreements11 and 38 were pri-
 
  6.   CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) .  
    7.     Id. at 12.  
  8.   Cf. Rebecca Ray, Janet C. Gornik & John Schmitt, Who Cares? Assessing Generosity and Gender 
Equality in Parental Leave Policy Designs in 21 Countries, 20 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 196, 196–198 (2010); 
Majella Kilkey & Jonathan Bradshaw, Lone Mothers, Economic Well‐Being, and Policies, in GENDER AND 
WELFARE STATE REGIMES 147 (Diane Sainsbury ed., 1999).  
  9.   Cobble, supra note 4.  
  10.   Catherine Hakim, for instance, claimed that women could be divided in to three groups ac‐
cording to their own preferences: Home‐centered women; work‐centered women and women who 
prefer to combine employment and family work without giving a fixed priority to either. Each group 
of women might prefer to promote “gender equality” in a different way. Hakim, supra note 4, at 434–
35. Bell Hooks maintained that mainstream feminism’s reliance on white, middle‐class, and profes‐
sional spokeswomen obscured the involvement, leadership, and centrality of women of color and 
poor women in the movement for women’s liberation. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM 
MARGIN TO CENTER 1–15 (2000). Feminist scholars, belonging to the “third wave of feminism” use 
personal storytelling to help deconstruct the myth that being a woman is a singular experience. See 
Janus, supra note 4; Rory Dicker & Alison Piepmeier, Introduction to CATCHING A WAVE: RECLAIMING 
FEMINISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 3, 5 (Rory Dicker & Alison Piepmeier eds., 2003).  
  11.   The research examined the agreements that apply to: technical, administrative, social scien‐
tists, engineers, doctors, veterinarians, pharmacists, psychologists, social workers, lawyers and prose‐
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vate sector agreements,12 allowing a comparison between the two sectors.13 The 
research also includes 38 extension orders of the Israeli Minister of the Economy, 
which extend collective agreements to apply to all workers in the sector or in the 
country.14 The research additionally includes Israel’s civil service regulation (Tak-
shir) which is partly integrated in the collective agreements of the public sector.15 
Finally the research also includes all the collective agreements applicable to Teva 
Pharmaceutical Industries (199 agreements) and El-Al Airlines (571 agree-
ments).16 Teva and El-Al were chosen as case studies of two corporations (in con-
trast to sectors) regulated by collective agreements. 
This research focuses on collective agreements and not on legislation, case-
law, or “law in action”, in contrast to most employment law research, which fo-
cuses on legislation and court rulings and not on collective agreements.17 Social 
science researchers focus on “law in action” and on the actual existence of pay 
gaps or discrimination in society. This is not surprising. First, collective agree-
ments are not easy to study because they frequently change, and, in many cases, 
old versions are not combined, nor are they replaced by new updated versions. 
For example, hundreds of outdated Teva agreements were reviewed due to the 
lack of one updated version. Second, collective agreements—as well as union 
membership—are in decline, and their studies are archaic.18 Nevertheless, unions 
are still central players in labor market regulation.19 Collective agreements con-
 
cutors, biochemists, microbiologists and employees laboratories, engineers and technicians, X‐ray 
technicians, occupational therapists, nurses, teachers and local authority employees, and academic 
staff. All collective agreements were published in COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, VOL. 1‐5 (Moshe Paster‐
nak ed., 2013) [hereinafter Collective Agreements]. 
  12.   The research examined the agreements in the following sectors: security and protection, 
cleaning and maintenance, gas stations, hotel industry, plastics, textile and clothing, construction and 
public works, tree  industry, tiles, cinema, laundries, rubber industry, leather industry, in tanning, 
print, cardboard, garages, metal industry, electrical and electronics, ceramics, glass, baking,  juice, 
oils, chocolate, coffee, flour, agriculture, cigarettes, pharmaceutical industry, the diamond industry, 
human resource companies, import industry, exports and trade, retail trade sectors, the transport sec‐
tor, mechanical engineering equipment operators, artists, travel guides, hairdresser’s and remodel‐
ling contractors. All collective agreements were published in Collective Agreements, supra note 11.    
  13.   The 18 collective agreements from the public sector apply to more workers than the 38 col‐
lective agreements in the private sector.  
  14.   All extension orders were published in Collective Agreements, supra note 11.      
  15.   The Takshir therefore served as a way to verify the legal status at the public sector, where 
there was no combined, updated version of the collective agreements.  
  16.   These collective agreements were published on the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Labour website, available at http://apps.moital.gov.il/Agreements/Search.aspx.  
  17.   In a search of U.S. & Canadian law review article titles in Lexis‐Nexis conducted on Septem‐
ber 9, 2012, only six articles contained the term “collective agreements” in their title. In comparison, 
the term ‘employment law’ appears in 1,132 article titles. 
  18.   On the decline in union density see Press Release, International Labour Organization, ILO 
highlights global challenge to trade unions (Nov. 4, 1997), http://www.ilo.org/global/about‐the‐
ilo/press‐and‐media‐centre/news/WCMS_008032/lang‐‐en/index.htm#N_1>  (discussing decline in 
global trade‐union membership); David G. Blanchflower & Richard B. Freeman, Unionism in the Unit‐
ed States and other advanced OECD countries, 31 INDUS. REL. 56, 57–60 (1992) (discussing major changes 
in the world that placed union movements in developed countries under stress). 
  19.   See International Labour Organization, supra note 18 (“[T]he drop in union numbers has not 
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tinue to regulate the working conditions of many workers throughout the world. 
Moreover, it seems that they will not disappear anytime soon. In the United 
States, for example, there are approximately 180,000 collective agreements, with 
60,000 of them negotiated each year.20 Therefore, the study of collective agree-
ments has strong policy implications. 
 
II. UNION REPRESENTATION THEORY 
 
Researchers disagree on the question of whether unions promote equality in 
general and gender equality in particular. Several researchers have shown that 
unions tend to promote wage equality (at least in corporatist countries).21 Gillian 
Whitehouse and Jennifer Curtin, for example, argue that the existence of central-
ized wage bargaining has a considerable impact on reducing the gender-wage 
differential.22 Others point to unions’ ability to promote policies that are benefi-
cial to workers and their families, not only in corporatist countries but also in lib-
eral regimes such as the United States.23 
Nevertheless, union representation is inherently problematic. Robert Mi-
chels, for instance, has argued that union leaders acquire and retain power over 
the political process, which they then use against the interests of the member-
ship. Leadership brings importance, expertise, and different lifestyles that the 
leader seeks to protect.24 To give another example, Richard Hyman used a Marx-
ist analysis of industrial relations to claim that officials were more likely to sup-
press irregular and distributive activities than to challenge managerial control.25 
One of the problems of union representation is their tendency to advocate 
for the median worker.26 As unions are political institutions with contract ratifi-
cation and leadership selection achieved through majority voting, this model im-
plies that unions will negotiate compensation packages that reflect the prefer-
ences of the median worker. They do not reflect the preferences of the marginal 
worker.27 The commonly held opinion is that unions tend to neglect workers in 
 
translated into a corresponding drop in influence. In most countries, trade unions have managed to 
consolidate their strength in core sectors, enlist constituents in emerging sectors and develop new 
collective bargaining strategies, often on a global scale.”). Regarding Israel, see GUY MUNDLAK, 
FADING CORPORATISM: ISRAEL’S LABOR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION (2007). 
  20.   Jillian Crocker & Dan Clawson, Buying Time: Gendered Patterns in Unions Contracts, 59 SOC. 
PROBS. 459, 461 (2012); GARY CHAISON, UNIONS IN AMERICA 107–08 (2005).  
  21.   For a literature review on corporatism and equality, see MUNDLAK, supra note 19, at 26–30. 
  22.   Gillian Whitehouse, Legislation and Labour Market Gender Inequality: An Analysis of OECD 
Countries, 6 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 65, 79 (1992); JENNIFER CURTIN, WOMEN AND TRADE UNIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 149 (1999); see also Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender 
Earnings Gap: Some International Evidence, in DIFFERENCES AND CHANGES IN WAGE STRUCTURES 105 
(Richard B. Freeman & Lawrence F. Katz eds., 1995).  
  23.   Crocker & Clawson, supra note 20, at 462.  
  24.   ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL 
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 276–78 (Eden & Cedar Paul trans., 1959).  
  25.   RICHARD HYMAN, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A MARXIST INTRODUCTION (1975).  
  26.   Bruce E. Kaufman, Models of Union Wage Determination: What Have We Learned Since Dunlop 
and Ross?, 41 INDUS. REL. 110, 139 (2002).  
  27.   John W. Budd, The Effect of Unions on Employee Benefits and Non‐Wage Compensation: Monopo‐
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the periphery and the lower echelons of the market. In a previous research study, 
I showed how unions tend to under-represent the interests of elderly workers.28 
Several researchers have shown that unions similarly neglect the interests of for-
eign workers.29  
Women in Israel are not a minority group in terms of the total proportion of 
the general population. In fact, women are about half of Israel’s population and 
more than half of Israel’s union members.30 The rate of women out of the total 
number of unionized and non-unionized workers is similar. The median union 
member could be a female just as he could be male. In other words, unions 
should theoretically represent women’s interests just as they represent men’s in-
terests. Indeed, as noted above, several researchers point to unions’ ability to 
promote policies which are beneficial to workers and their families.31 
Nevertheless, unions tend to systematically under-represent women’s inter-
ests and to promote discriminatory policies.32 There are a few explanations for 
this contradiction. First, although half of the unionized workers are women, most 
union representatives are men. Gill Kirton pointed out that women in the UK are 
under-represented in all levels of union decision-making structures, from the lo-
cal level of workplace representatives to paid officials and executive bodies.33 
This gap between the high rates of unionized women to the low rates of women 
among union representatives creates a “democratic deficit.”34 As Linda Dickens 
explains, the absence of women from the democratic process had negative results 
on the outcomes of the bargaining process. As a consequence, “women’s issues” 
are inadequately addressed.35 
Why are women absent from the decision-making structure of unions? Eliz-
abeth Lawrence has succinctly answered this question by pointing out that many 
women have double workloads, combining paid work in employment with un-
 
ly, Power, Collective Voice and Facilitation, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO? A TWENTY YEAR PERSPECTIVE 160, 
162–64 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007); Ton Wilthagen & Ralf Rogowski, The Legal 
Regulation of Transitional Labor Market, in THE DYNAMICS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT: SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
THROUGH TRANSITIONAL LABOUR MARKETS 233, 244–45 (Gunther Schmid & Bernard Gazier eds., 
2002); Alain Supiot, The transformation of work and the future of labor law in Europe: a multidisciplinary 
perspective, 138 INT’L LAB. REV. 31, 41 (1999).  
  28.   Lilach Lurie, Can Unions Promote Employability? Senior Workers in Israel’s Collective Agree‐
ments, 42 INDUS. L. J. 249 (2013).  
  29.   Einat Albin, Union Responsibility to Migrant Workers: A Global Justice Approach, 34 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 133 (2013).  
  30.   Yinon Cohen et al., Unpacking Union Density: Union Membership and Coverage in the Transfor‐
mation of the Israeli IR System, 42 INDUS. REL. 692, 704 (2003).   
  31.   Crocker & Clawson, supra note 20. 
  32.   ANNE MCBRIDE, GENDER DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 16–17 (2001); Cynthia Cockburn, 
Strategies for Gender Democracy: Strengthening the Representation of Trade Union Women in the European 
Social Dialogue, 3 EUR. J. WOMEN’S STUD. 7, 7 (1996).    
  33.   GILL KIRTON, THE MAKING OF WOMEN TRADE UNIONISTS 12–15 (2006). On union representa‐
tion in the United States, see Michelle Kaminski & Elaine K. Yakura, Women’s Union Leadership: Closing 
the Gender Gap, 11 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 459 (2008).   
  34.   KIRTON, supra note 33, at 22–3; Cockburn, supra note 32, at 18. 
  35.   Linda Dickens, Gender, Race and Employment Equality in Britain: Inadequate Strategies and the 
Role of Industrial Relations Actors, 28 INDUS. REL. J. 282, 283 (1997). 
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paid work at home. This double role makes it difficult for women to take a third 
set of tasks and responsibilities as a union office-holder. Women who find the 
time to serve as union office-holders are often childless or single.36 These women 
do not always represent the interests of working mothers. 
These problems are not easily solved. Even unions that attempt to close the 
representation gap find results difficult to achieve. For instance, Anne McBride 
shows that even unions that adopted “gender democracy” strategies (i.e. reserva-
tion of seats in proportion to the number of women in the constituency) such as 
the British UNISON have not succeeded in promoting the empowerment of 
women as a social group.37 As McBride explains, “newly active [women] are less 
likely to speak and as a result the experienced [men] become the shapers.”38 
McBride emphasizes the importance of empowering groups of women, not simp-
ly individual women.39  
The second reason for unions’ under-representation of women is because 
women tend to participate in precarious atypical work.40 Unions tend to repre-
sent the interests of the “standard” full-time worker who works for a single em-
ployer. Unions do not always have the legal capacity to represent “outsiders” 
such as contractors and agency workers. Even where “legal capacity” is not an 
issue, unions tend to prefer the standard worker.41 Women are disproportionate-
ly represented in non-standard atypical work, which may include part-time 
work, temporary agency work, flex-work, self-employed homecare work, and 
contractor work. 42  All of these forms of work tend to be under-represented by 
unions. 
The third reason for unions’ under-representation of women is that unions’ 
representatives have suffered, at least historically, from stereotypes against 
women. According to these stereotypes, men should work outside the house 
while women should concentrate on housework. A female’s work should only be 
viewed as a small supplement to the male breadwinner’s work. Furthermore, 
male union representatives suffer from patriarchal stereotypes. Women repre-
sentatives suffer from them as well.43 An example of these stereotypes could be 
found in unions’ struggle in the United States., United Kingdom, Spain, and Isra-
 
  36.   ELIZABETH LAWRENCE, GENDER AND TRADE UNIONS 20–21, 87–90, 118 (1994).  
  37.   MCBRIDE, supra note 32, at 1–8. 
  38.   Id. at 167.  
  39.   Id. at 179–81. 
  40.   Sandra Fredman, Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity, 33 INDUS. L. J. 299, 301–4 
(2004). 
  41.   Supiot, supra note 27, at 41. 
  42.   Definition of “atypical work,” Work, EUROFOUND, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/atypicalwork.htm 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2014).  
  43.   Dafna N. Izraeli & Ada Poraz, Women and Men as Shop Stewards in Israeli Industry: Research 
Report (Tel‐Aviv U., Inst.e for Soc. & Lab. Res., 1980). Izraeli and Poraz show that women union offic‐
ers believe that they are less influential than men. Izraeli and Poraz also show that as the proportion 
of women increases in the specific workplace and as the women were elected to be the chairperson 
they behave in a less stereotypical fashion. Id. at 16–17.  
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el for family wage.44 The idea of family wage is one of social justice: A worker 
should be paid not according to his or her production, but according to his or her 
needs. A married worker with five children has more economic needs than a sin-
gle mother. This sentiment is shared by employers as well.  For example, Henry 
Ford paid his famous “five dollars a day” only to decently married men. Mothers 
earned a great deal less.45 
In Israel, Histadrut—the country’s major employment union—promoted 
“family wage” from its very first days. Local professional unions (which were all 
part of Histadrut Federation) promoted a “family supplement” to which only 
married men were entitled. During the 1930s and the 1940s, the “family supple-
ment” constituted a large part of a married man’s wage, especially when the man 
had several children.46 Bat-Sheva Margalit-Stern shows that, between 1920 and 
1939, there was a large wage-gap between male and female workers performing 
the exact same job. For example, in 1930, a man’s weekly wage in the needle in-
dustry was twice that of a female counterpart.47 Margalit-Stern also shows that 
unions in the timber industry explicitly agreed that a decent pay for a woman 
should be half that of a man’s.48 
The fourth cause for gender discrimination is what is called “statistical dis-
crimination.”49 Statistically, the average woman will have children. Additionally, 
for social and cultural reasons, in order to raise these children, the average wom-
an will take more time out from the workforce than would the average man.50  
Based on these statistics, unions assume that in contrast to men, women have 
other options besides working in the labor market—they can work in their house 
instead. Therefore, unions tend to prefer men’s interests over a women’s when 
deciding who will be dismissed, or who should receive supplements to their 
wages.51 
 
III. BACKGROUND ON ISRAEL 
 
A. Israel’s Welfare Regime 
 
Using Gøsta Esping-Anderson’s distinctions, one may easily describe Israel 
 
  44.   On family wage in the U.S., see Dorothy Sue Cobble, When Feminism Had Class, in WHAT’S 
CLASS GOT TO DO WITH IT? AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY‐FIRST CENTURY 23, 31–32 (Michael 
Zweig ed., 2004).  
  45.   RAY BATCHELOR, HENRY FORD, MASS PRODUCTION, MODERNISM, AND DESIGN 49–50 (1994); 
John R. Lee, The So‐Called Profit Sharing System in the Ford Plant, 65 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 297, 302 (1916).  
  46.   ZEV KARMY, TRADE UNIONS IN ISRAEL 180–86 (1959).  
  47.   BAT‐SHEVA MARGALIT STERN, REDEMPTION IN BONDAGE: THE WOMEN WORKERS’ MOVEMENT 
IN ERETZ ISRAEL 1920‐1939, at 208–11 (2006). 
  48.   Id. at 320.  
  49.   Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 
1320 (1989).  
  50.   Id. at 1315–17.  
  51.   CLAUS OFFE, DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM: CONTEMPORARY TRANSFORMATIONS OF WORK AND 
POLITICS 41–42, 159 (1985).   
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as a corporatist regime with social democratic elements.52 In past decades, Hista-
drut lost control over its healthcare and pension plans, but it is still part of a tri-
pillar roundtable that decides employment and economic policies in the coun-
try.53 56% of Israeli workers are covered by collective agreements, but only 34% 
of Israeli workers are unionized (compared to 80% in the 1980s).54 This gap be-
tween union membership and collective agreements’ coverage is a result of Isra-
el’s corporatist legislation.55 The Collective Agreements Law declared that collec-
tive agreements apply to all employees included in the agreement, no matter 
their membership status.56 Moreover, due to the ministry’s power to extend a col-
lective agreement, an agreement can also apply to employers who were not par-
ties to the collective agreements and to their employees.57 
 
B. Women in Unions 
 
Unlike unions in many other countries, Histadrut never excluded women 
from union membership.58 Since the first days of Histadrut, female members 
tried to promote women workers’ interests through three separate bodies within 
Histadrut: the Women’s Workers Movement, the Organization of Working 
Mothers, and the Department for Salaried Women.59 The Women’s Workers 
Movement and the Organization of Working Mothers later merged and renamed 
themselves Na’amat. Na’amat was concerned with women’s interests as a whole, 
 
  52.     Esping‐Anderson acknowledges in his book that each country might have a few elements 
from several welfare regimes. See GØSTA ESPING‐ANDERSON, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE 
CAPITALISM  26–29 (1990). Stier, Lewin‐Epstein, and Braun describe Israel’s welfare regime as a con‐
servative‐corporatist welfare state with a high level of support to mothers’ employment. Haya Stier et 
al., Welfare Regimes, Family‐Supportive Policies, and Women’s Employment along the Life‐Course, 106 AM. J. 
SOC. 1731, 1740 (2001). Mundlak claims that the industrial relations and labour law in Israel changed 
from a European style of corporatism to a model of pluralism. MUNDLAK, supra note 19, at 35. But see 
his later work Guy Mundlak, Addressing the Legitimacy Gap in the Israeli Corporatist Revival, 47 BRIT. J. 
INDUS. REL. 765 (2009) (discussing several episodes of nationwide collective agreements and social 
pacts in recent years). In the past few decades Israel has adopted more and more characteristics of a 
“liberal welfare regime” including a privatization policy. Daphne Barak‐Erez, The Public Law of Privat‐
ization: Models, Norms and Challenges, 30 TEL‐AVIV U. L. REV. 461, 500 (2008); EYAL PELEG, 
PRIVATIZATION AS POLLICIZATION: PRIVATIZED BODIES IN PUBLIC LAW (2005).  
  53.   MUNDLAK, supra note 19, at 121–24. 
  54.   Haberfeld et al., Trade Union Density in Israel 2000‐2006: Years of Stagnation, 12 LAB., SOC’Y. & 
LAW 2–3(2010); Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 692–712; MUNDLAK, supra note 19, at 43–44.  
  55.   MUNDLAK, supra note 19, at 51. 
  56.   Collective Agreements Law 5717–1957, §§ 15–16 (1957) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/9034396F‐AC64‐4C44‐9466‐25104B45FBB1.htm. 
  57.   Id. at § 30. In almost all EU member states, mechanisms exist to make collective agreements 
legally binding for all employees and employers in a certain sector or in the entire country. On collec‐
tive bargaining agreements in the EU see Peter Kerckhofs, Extension of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
in the EU, EUROFOUND (2011), available at 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2011/54/en/1/EF1154EN.pdf. 
  58.   CURTIN, supra note 22, at 98.  
  59.   Id. at 99. 
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including workers and non-workers.60 For example, Na’amat established a net-
work of 280 day care centers for over 20,000 infants and toddlers, which are still 
in operation today. Na’amat also provides legal counseling for individual and 
groups of women.61 The Department for Salaried Women was intended to attend 
to women’s interests in collective agreements and to promote equal pay and re-
duced working hours for working parents.62 Currently this department empha-
sizes the training of potential female union representatives. However, neither the 
Department for Salaried Women nor Na’amat is a powerful section within His-
tadrut.63 
Histadrut’s constitution contains representation quotas for women in a few 
of its leading bodies:64 Histadrut’s House of Representatives has 171 members 
and Histadrut’s Congress has 2001 members.65 In elections to both institutions, 
women should make up at least 30% of the parties’ lists.66 Histadrut subjects sec-
torial unions to the quota system as well.67 However, the quota system does not 
apply to Histadrut’s Leadership, which is the highest body of Histadrut. As of 
November 2013, there are only five members in Histadrut’s Leadership, which 
consists of 49 members.68 Moreover, men have always occupied the highest posi-
tion in Histadrut, the Secretary General.69 
 
C. Gender Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
 
Until the end of the 1980s, few Israeli laws specifically dealt with matters of 
gender equality in the workplace.70 Since then, Israel’s parliament has enacted 
only a few statutes to provide gender equality in the workplace. In 1987, the 
Equal Retirement Age prohibited gender discrimination in the mandatory re-
tirement age.71 In 1988, the Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law prohibited 
 
  60.   Izraeli & Poraz, supra note 43, at 12–15.  
  61.   About Na’amat, NA’AMAT, http://www.naamat.org.il/aboutE.php?cat=183&incat=0 (last visit‐
ed Oct. 31, 2014).   
  62.   Izraeli & Poraz, supra note 43, at 12–15.  
  63.   CURTIN, supra note 22; Izraeli & Poraz, supra note 43, at 13. 
  64.   For the history of quotas for women in Histadrut, see CURTIN, supra note 58, at 100–02; Izraeli 
& Poraz, supra note 43, at 13.   
  65.   Histadrut, Histadrut’s Constitution Chapter 4(2)(A),(2011), available at 
http://www.histadrut.org.il/files/684fa1c2c20308be189cc9ded6ca7e5c.pdf .  
  66.   Id. at Chapter 4(2)(B)(15).  
  67.   Id. at Chapter 6. 
  68.   Histadrut Leadership, HISTADRUT, http://www.histadrut.org.il/index.php?page_id=16 (last vis‐
ited Nov. 7, 2014) [hereinafter Histadrut Leadership].  
  69.   The History of Histadrut, HISTADRUT 
(2013),http://www.histadrut.org.il/index.php?page_id=296 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014) [hereinafter His‐
tadrut History].  
  70.   RUTH HALPERIN‐KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 115 (2004). Exceptions 
were the Women’s Equal Right Law from 1951 which demanded that “one law apply to men and 
women regarding every legal action.” Id. at 115–16.  Another exception was the Equal Pay Law from 
1964. Id. at 115.  
  71.   Id. at 116. The law was later replaced by the Retirement Age Act from 2004. 
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gender-based discrimination in all stages of employment, from hiring to working 
conditions, promotions, and termination.72 Furthermore, the Male and Female 
Workers Equal Pay Law from 1996 (which replaced the 1964 Equal Pay Law) 
added an explicit right to equal pay for the same work.73 This law declared that 
men and women employed by the same employer in the same workplace are en-
titled to equal pay for the same work.74 The findings of this article presented be-
low will show that several collective agreements violate this express provision, 
by providing different wages to men and women. Nevertheless, Israeli law is 
clear in prohibiting such gender-based discrimination.75 Moreover, in the Israeli 
legal system, whenever a conflict appears between the provisions of a statute and 
the provisions of a collective agreement, the provisions of the law shall prevail 
and override.76 
In tandem with the gender equality legislation described above, Israel’s law 
has also shifted from providing mothers’ rights to providing overall parental 
rights.77 While the Employment of Women Law of 1954 provided a right to a paid 
maternity leave only for working mothers, amendments expanded the rights to 
working fathers as well.  Today, Israeli women are entitled to 14 weeks paid ma-
ternity leave and up to a year unpaid leave. Israel’s law protects new working 
mothers from dismissal and forbids employers from discharging the mothers 
during their leave (whether paid or unpaid) and for sixty days from their return 
to work.78 While working fathers are entitled to utilize most of these rights in-
stead of their female partners, the law still defines mothers as the main users of 
these rights. A father may use the right only when the mother relinquishes it. 
Not only are fathers entitled to take maternity leave, Article 4 of Israel’s 
Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law from 1988 declares that “where . . . a 
woman employee has any entitlement by virtue of her being a parent, such enti-
tlement shall also be accorded to a male employee at the workplace where the 
aforesaid term of employment is customary.”79 This law declares that a right to 
“a shortened working day” and “to use the services of a day care center” should 
be provided equally to both male and female parents (whenever provided to 
mothers).80 While this equal entitlement provision presents a significant move 
 
  72.   Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748‐1988 (1988) (Isr.). The original law from 1988 
prohibited gender based discrimination and discrimination due to marital status. During the 90s the 
Israeli parliament added to the law 14 categories of prohibited discrimination. Cf. MUNDLAK, supra 
note 19, at 181–182.  
  73.   Male and Female Workers Equal Pay Law, 5756‐1996 (1996) (Isr.). 
  74.   The Male and Female Workers Equal Pay Law 5756‐1996, §2 (1996) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.moit.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/8CFAB6A8‐B2AA‐4E42‐A2DE‐0CF2A1ECB012/0/14.pdf.  
  75.   The Male and Female Equal Pay Law from 1996 was recently enforced by the courts at HCJ 
1758/11 Orit Goren v. Homecentre (2012) (Isr.). 
  76.   Collective Agreements Law 5717–1957 (1957) (Isr.), available at 
http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/9034396F‐AC64‐4C44‐9466‐25104B45FBB1.htm. 
  77.   HALPERIN‐KADDARI, supra note 70, at 112. 
  78.    Employment of Women Law, 5714–1954, §§ 6–9  (1954) (Isr.), available at  
http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/D1F1E33F‐9227‐49DA‐8E74‐BC8D523C642F/0/13.pdf.  
  79.   Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748‐1988(4) (1988) (Isr.). 
  80.   Id. 
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away from mothers’ rights towards parents’ rights, the transition, as noted 
above, is incomplete. The law still defines mothers as the main users of these 
rights, and the fathers may only utilize them instead of the mothers if they de-
cline to use them. 
 
D. Women in Israel’s Labor Market 
 
While Israeli law seems progressive in its approach to gender equality, 
women’s position in the Israeli labor market is far from satisfactory.81 Fewer 
women work than men, and the women who do earn less than their male coun-
terparts. For example, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 
2012, 69% of Israeli males took part in the labor force, compared to only 58% of 
Israeli females.82 Both rates are below OECD average: in 2011, 79% of men and 
65% of women participated in the labor force in OECD countries.83 
Israeli women (as their fellows in the OECD)84 not only work less than men, 
but also earn less (Table 1). One explanation for the wage gap is the gender dif-
ferences in the number of working hours per week. Women work less and, there-
fore, earn less. But even if we compare the payment for a single hour of work, we 
find a wage gap between men and women. As the Israeli Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics shows, women earn less in almost all sectors except the construction sec-
tor.85 
 
E. Israel’s Civil Service Regulation (the Takshir) 
 
Workers in the Israeli public sector are subject to the Israeli Civil Service 
Regulation (the Takshir). In June 2013, Israel’s Civil Service Commission revised 
the Takshir entitling parents (mothers and fathers) to enjoy rights to reduced 
working hours.86 Israel’s Civil Service Commission also revised the term “moth-
ers’ job” to the term “parents’ job.”87 The change of terms was not only a rhetor-
ical gesture, but it was a real attempt to “increase equality in the distribution of 
roles in the family, to further help working mothers and to make it easier for 
state employee fathers to take their parenting rights, and spend more time with 
 
  81.   Noya Rimalt, From Law to Politics: the Path to Gender Equality, 18 ISR. STUD. 5, 6‐7 (2013). 
  82.    Males Aged 15 and Over, by Labour Force Characteristics, ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU OF 
STATISTICS, http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/saka0613m/pdf/tab02_m.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2014); Females Aged 15 and over by Labour Force, ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS,  
http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/saka0613m/pdf/tab03_m.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
  83.   Employment: Labor force participation rate, by sex, OECD 
 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54751 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
  84.   Israel’s wage gender gap (20.7) is a bit higher than the OECD’s average wage gender gap 
(15). Employment: Labor force participation rate, by sex, OECD,  
 http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54751 (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
  85.   Gross Income Per Employee by Industry and Sex, ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS,  
http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications13/1524/pdf/t21.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2014).  
  86.   Israel’s Civil Service Regulation, Change of the term “mother’s hours of work” to “parent’s hours 
of work” (2013). http://csc.gov.il//DataBases/NashamPosts/Documents/tashag18.pdf. 
  87.    Id.  
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their children.”  The revision in the Takshir is in line with Article 4 of the Em-
ployment (Equal Opportunities) Law of 1988. According to the Takshir, all par-
ents working in Israel’s civil service are entitled to “family rights,” which include 
reduced working hours and employer contribution for day care costs. However, 
this right is not automatically realized. The parent must file a form declaring that 
she or he wishes to realize the right, that her or his partner is working (employed 
or self-employed), and that her or his partner is not realizing the right herself or 
himself (even if the right does not exist in the partner’s workplace). 
 
IV. FINDINGS 
 
Most collective agreements in the private sector contain a section entitled 
“employment of women.” Despite the promising title, this section regularly de-
clares that “[a] female worker will be entitled to her rights in accordance to the 
law” and nothing more.88 This section does not provide women with any other 
right beyond her legal rights as defined in Israel’s extensive legislation. Moreo-
ver, the findings of this research show that Israel’s collective agreements often 
contradict the law, providing rights that discriminate between men and women. 
The research points to three rights provided on the basis of gender: a right to a 
family supplement, a right to work reduced working hours, and a right to day 
care expenditures. 
 
A. Men Are Entitled to a Higher Salary than Women 
 
One major finding of the research is that according to most of Israel’s collec-
tive agreements, married men are entitled to higher wages than married women. 
In 55% of all collective agreements and in 74% of the collective agreements in the 
private sector, a married man is entitled to a special supplement to his salary, 
provided that his wife is not working (Table 2). Married women whose spouses 
are not working are not entitled to the same benefits. For example, the collective 
agreement in the leather industry declares that “married employees are entitled 
to a ‘family supplement’ for non-working wives.”89 The sum of the supplement is 
about one Israeli Shekel ($0.30) a day.90 The right for a family supplement ap-
pears only in 17% of the collective agreements in the public sector. Five collective 
agreements in the private sector and a single collective agreement in the public 
sector integrated the family supplement into the salary. 
Most collective agreements in the private sector provide the right only to 
married men whose wives are not working. Only a single collective agreement in 
the agriculture sector contains an egalitarian clause declaring that “the right for 
 
  88.   E.g., Drivers’ Collective Agreement, article 65; Collective Agreement in the Plastic Industry, 
article 11; Collective Agreement in the Coffee Industry, article 57, in Collective Agreements, supra note 
11.  
  89.   Collective Agreement in the Leather Industry, article 9, in Collective Agreements, supra note 
11.  
  90.   A  search  through  the  Israeli  legal  search  engine, Nevo,  shows  that  hundreds  of plaintiffs 
sued for and received the family supplement from their employers. This right appears in 391 cases.  
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family supplement [is given] for non-working partner (men or women).”91 Sev-
eral collective agreements extend the right to widows and to women who are 
married to men with disabilities.92 Some collective agreements extend the right to 
divorced women who are sole breadwinners.93 One collective agreement pro-
vides the right to mothers of small children under 14 who are sole breadwin-
ners.94 
 
B. Only Mothers Are Entitled to Work Reduced Working Hours 
 
Israel’s collective agreements contain two main arrangements of reduced 
working hours for parents. The first arrangement is the right of parents with 
young children to work reduced hours while their children are young. The sec-
ond right is the right of parents to work an hour less a day in the first year fol-
lowing the birth of their child. Collective agreements provide both rights mainly 
to mothers. Fathers are entitled to the right only if their partners have died and 
they care for their children by themselves. Surprisingly, the collective agreements 
have not changed through the years and do not comply with the amended legis-
lation or the Takshir, which entitles both parents to enjoy the right. 
As to the first right, to work reduced working hours, most collective agree-
ments in the public sector entitle parents of young children to work reduced 
hours while their children are young (Table 3). In fact, the only collective agree-
ment in the public sector that does not contain such a right is the collective 
agreement regarding academic staff. The ages of the children differ in the collec-
tive agreements. For example, the doctors’ collective agreement enables parents 
of two children younger than twelve or of one child (or more) younger than eight 
to work reduced hours.95 None of the sectorial collective agreements in the pri-
vate sector contain such a right, nor do the collective agreements in Teva and El-
Al. 
As to the second right, several collective agreements in the public sector en-
title a parent to work an hour less a day in the first year following the birth of her 
child (Table 4). In several collective agreements, the right is defined as a “nursing 
hour,” although the agreements do not explicitly give this benefit to nursing 
mothers. This right broadens the legal right (given to every mother in Israel) to 
be absent from work “from the end of the maternity leave until the end of 4 
months thereafter - one hour per day. . . .”96 Surprisingly, most collective agree-
ments in the public sector do not contain this right even though it appears in the 
Takshir.  None of the sectorial collective agreements in the private sector contain 
such a right. 
 
  91.   Appendix B to the extension order, supra note 11. 
  92.   E.g., the Collective Agreement in Gas Stations, article 7d; the Collective Agreement in the 
Chocolate Industry, article 4.3, in Collective Agreements, supra note 11.  
  93.   Collective Agreement in the Cardboard Industry, article 10, in Collective Agreements, supra 
note 11. 
  94.   Collective Agreement in the Cleaning Industry, article 8, in Collective Agreements, supra note 
11. 
  95.   Doctors’ Collective Agreement, article 5, in Collective Agreements, supra note 11. 
  96.   Employment of Women Law, 5714–1954 § 7(c)(3) (1954) (Isr.). 
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C. Only Mothers Are Entitled to Day Care Expenditures 
 
All collective agreements in the public sector contain a right to a day care 
subsidy (Table 5). Only two collective agreements in the private sector, in the ag-
riculture sector and hotels industry, contain such a right. The collective agree-
ments in Teva97 and in El-Al provide the right as well.98 
Most collective agreements provide the right to day care subsidies mainly to 
mothers. Fathers are entitled to the right only if they are widowers or divorced 
(Table 6). Only the collective agreement for academic staff provides an equal pa-
rental right to a day care subsidy (Table 6). As noted above, according to Israel’s 
legislation, fathers are entitled to the right subject to a few conditions. Neverthe-
less, the social partners (trade unions and employers) have yet to revise most col-
lective agreements and they do not fit the law. 
The terms of eligibility to the benefit differs from one collective agreement 
to another. In most collective agreements, the right is provided to mothers of 
children under the age of five.99 The sum of the benefit differs as well. None of 
the collective agreements provide a day-care center for the workers’ children. 
None of the collective agreements provide a full refund of day-care expenses. 
Most collective agreements in the public sector provide a benefit of between $80 
(for one child under the age of five) and $140 (for two or more children under the 
age of five).100 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Unions Promote a Patriarchal Division of Labor 
 
The findings reinforce the assumption that unions promote a patriarchal di-
vision of labor. The collective agreements provide a right to family wage only to 
men and a right to reduced working hours and day care expenditures only to 
women. The collective agreements’ subtext is clear: men should go to work and 
women should stay at home. The collective agreements in the public sector pro-
vide women with some kind of compensation in return for their low income. 
This compensation takes the form of reduced working hours and day care ex-
penditures, and it allows mothers in the public sector to combine “work” and 
“care.” Women in the private sector receive no compensation in return for their 
low wages but are expected to stay at home. While collective agreements in the 
 
  97.   Collective Agreement in Teva 840755 (1984a); Collective Agreement in Teva 840883 (1984b); 
Collective Agreement in Teva 850475 (1985), supra note 16. 
  98.   Collective Agreement in El‐Al 900588 (1990), supra note 16.  
  99.   E.g., Collective Agreement in the Hotel Industry, Article 43; Collective Agreement of Social 
Workers, article 24c, in Collective Agreements, supra note 11. 
100.   In Israeli shekels, the sum is between 300 and 500 shekels. These are the “default” rates in 
the Israeli civil service. See Memorandum from the Head of the Wages and Labor Agreements De‐
partments N. to Union Members (Jan. 4, 2011), available at  
http://www.pionet.co.il/hahistadrut_pdf/doc20040608185450.pdf.  
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public sector promote substantive gender equality, the collective agreements in 
the private sector do not promote formal equality or substantive equality. 
The findings reinforce the literature presented in the first part of the paper, 
and show that although women constitute half of union members, unions do not 
adequately address women’s interests. The collective agreements do not give 
women a real opportunity to decide how to balance work and family. 
The first explanation for the findings is that unions do not represent wom-
en’s interests due to a lack of representation. Although women are half of the 
population and half of the unionized workers, women are not adequately repre-
sented in unions’ senior positions and committees. In fact, since the establish-
ment of Histadrut in 1921, only men served as its chairmen.101 Today, as in the 
past, mostly men serve in Histadrut’s management functions. Only five women 
serve in Histadrut leading board, compared to 44 men.102 This lack of representa-
tion stands in contrast to Histadrut’s efforts through the years to promote wom-
en in its institutions. 
The second explanation for the findings is simply “old” stereotypes against 
women. The research reveals that unions (and employers) apply discriminatory 
biases in the collective agreements the workers sign. They consider female work-
ers to be workers who have another option besides work and thus deserve a 
lower salary. These findings reinforce the research mentioned above that show 
that unions seem to implement discriminatory practices against foreign workers 
and elderly workers.103  Prior research also shows that women representatives 
often apply similar practices to their male colleagues.104 Simultaneously, research 
shows that women apply discriminatory practices only when they are a small 
minority in the representative bodies and feel they must act according to their 
male colleagues’ rules.105 In places where women are represented in high num-
bers, women do not feel as pressured to apply discriminatory practices.106 
 
B. The Public Sector versus the Private Sector 
 
The findings also point to a large difference between the public sector and 
the private sector. While the collective agreements in the public sector clearly 
promote a patriarchal division of labor (men are entitled to a “family supple-
ment” while women are not), the collective agreements in the public sector pro-
mote a much more equal division of labor. Almost all of the collective agree-
ments in the public sector provide working mothers with a right to work reduced 
hours as well as a right to receive day care expenditures. These rights enable 
women to take part in the labor market and to combine both working at home 
and out of it. These “family rights” could perhaps explain the relatively large 
 
101.   CURTIN, supra note 22, at 98. 
102.   Histadrut Leadership, supra note 68.  
103.   See Albin, supra note 29, at 150; Lurie, supra note 28, at 263.  
104.   Izraeli & Poraz, supra note 43, at 16–17.  
105.   Id. 
106.   Id.; Drude Dahlerup, From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics, 11 
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 276, 275–298 (1988). 
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rates of women working in the public sector in Israel.107 
Public sector collective agreements could promote even more equality by 
providing rights to both parents and not only to mothers. In fact, current policy 
and feminist literature emphasize the importance of providing “parent rights” 
also to fathers.108 According to this literature, the way to reach equal participa-
tion of men and women in the labor market is through enabling men to take 
equal part in domestic tasks.109 Creating an equal division in domestic tasks also 
leads to wage equality. When men are able to equally share the domestic tasks 
with women, women will be able to work more hours and earn more salaries. 
Although unions could promote more equality in the public sector by pro-
moting parents’ rights, public sector collective agreements still promote much 
more equality than private sector collective agreements. One explanation for the 
discrepancy could be the different characteristics of unions. However, this expla-
nation does not seem to be comprehensive enough because in Israel, Histadrut 
represents most of the workers in both the public and the private sectors. 
The second explanation could be that although the same union represents 
both sectors, the local workers’ representatives in the public and private sectors 
promote different interests. While in the private sector the average worker could 
be either a woman or a man, in the public sector, most of the workers (65%) are 
women.110 According to the literature, it could be expected that in “female work-
places” women’s interests would be represented. However, it is hard to deter-
mine causality: are there many women because of the accommodated working 
conditions or are the working conditions a result of female authority in the 
workplace? 
The third and most likely explanation is that the differences between the 
two sectors have nothing to do with unions. According to this explanation, these 
rights were not a result of collective negotiation. The employer himself decided 
to provide these rights to workers and to include them in the collective agree-
ments. This explanation fits the June 2013 decision to replace “mother rights” in 
the public sector with “parent rights.” As noted above, Israel’s civil service 
commission decided to extend the right to work reduced working hours and the 
right to day care expenditures to fathers. Currently, both mothers and fathers in 
the public sector can enjoy these rights. Surprisingly, the unions were not in-
volved in this reform. The reform was a sole decision of the civil service commis-
sion. If this last explanation is correct, unions in Israel are affirmatively promot-
ing gender equality in neither sector.  
 
107.   Stier et al., supra note 3, at 1734–35; Orly Almagor‐Lotan, Wage Differentials between Men and 
Women in the Public Sector: Findings from the report at the Finance Ministry, Presented to the Committee on 
the Status of Women, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02950.pdf. 
108.   See Ray, Gornik & Schmitt, supra note 8, at 199 (“The so‐called ‘dual‐earner/dual‐carer’ mod‐
el, with some variations, has been developed and clarified mainly by feminist welfare state scholars 
in Europe . . .  The ‘earner‐carer’ model envisions a society in which men and women engage sym‐
metrically in both paid work and unpaid caregiving . . .”) (internal citations omitted); Julia L. Ernst, 
Review Essay: The UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women: A 
Commentary, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 890, 915–17 (2012). 
109.   Cf. RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 130– 44 (1997).   
110.   Almagor‐Lotan, supra note 107.  
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While all three of the explanations above are possible, the final outcome is 
the same: collective agreements in the public sector provide better gender equali-
ty than collective agreements in the private sector. The public sector in Israel is in 
a constant threat of downsizing. A long series of government decisions in the 
past decade threatens to privatize large portions and shrink its size. Fewer work-
ers are expected to enjoy the public sector’s gender equality in the future. 
 
C. Illegality 
 
A final but extremely important finding is that most collective agreements 
violate the law.111 Conley shows that in the United Kingdom, unions promoted 
equal pay through legislation, not through collective agreements. Instead of 
changing the collective agreements themselves, unions asked the courts to re-
quire the employer to pay equally. Conley associates this tool with the decentral-
ized system of collective agreements in the United Kingdom, which also contrib-
utes to similar results in the United States.112 In Israel the system of collective 
agreements is more centralized: there are extended sectorial collective agree-
ments. The corporatist Israeli structure could therefore explain in some part, the 
unions’ reluctance and even resistance to use legislation to provide equal pay. In 
fact, in Israel, NGOs, rather than unions, are the active agents who fight for equal 
pay. Nevertheless this does not explain why unions did not change collective 
agreements with employers to make them comply with the law. The illegality in 
collective agreements remains a stark anomaly and a flagrant case of gender dis-
crimination. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Almost thirty years have passed since Freeman and Medoff wrote their in-
fluential book on what unions do.113 Twenty years later, Freeman, who believes 
himself “older and presumably wiser,”114 pointed to two errors in his book. The 
first was the “failure to take account of unionism outside the U.S.” Freeman re-
gretted the book’s ignorance of more centralized and state-influenced economic 
systems where the tool of extension orders exists.115 The second error was the 
“failure to analyze public sector unionism.”116  Freeman admitted that due to the 
drop in unions’ power in the U.S. private sector, it seemed more important to re-
search unions’ role in the public sector. 
 
111.   Employment of Women Law, 5714–1954 §§ 6–9 (1954) (Isr.); Male and Female Workers 
Equal Pay Law, 5756–1996 (1996) (Isr.).  
112.   Hazel Conley, Trade unions, equal pay and the law in the UK, 35  ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 
309, 310‐12 (2013).   
113.   FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 1. 
114.   Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do? The 2004 M‐ Brane Stringtwister Edition 2((Nat’l Bu‐
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11410, 2005), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/2005June.pdf. 
115.   Id. at 7–11.   
116.    Id.  
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The current research recognizes and seeks to correct both errors. It analyzes 
unions’ role in Israel, a relatively corporatist centralized system, to show that 
they do not promote gender equality but in fact, promote a patriarchal division 
of labor. Are these findings unique to Israel’s institutional features or do they 
have broader implications? In 2005, Freeman claimed that “unions have a mo-
nopoly face and a voice face. The mix between them and the impact of unions on 
economic and political outcomes depends on the environment in which unions 
operate.”117 Israel is a single example dependent on its particular environment. 
Nevertheless, I believe that the current research might have broader implications 
regarding corporatist and liberal regimes, especially because the findings of the 
current research are consistent with other research done in liberal regimes. These 
consistencies are suggestive rather than conclusive, yet they pessimistically im-
ply that unions in corporatist and liberal regimes do not promote gender equali-
ty. 
This paper also contributes to our knowledge on unions in the public sector. 
The research reveals the great difference between collective agreements in the 
public sector and in the private sector, pointing to the unique “family-friendly 
policy” in public sector collective agreements. This finding is important because 
of the relative decline in union density in the private sector in many countries 
(the United States and Israel among them) and therefore to the greater im-
portance of unions in the public sector. The findings give the state itself rather 
than the unions the credit for the above “family-friendly policy”. Yet again, the 
shortcomings of unions in promoting gender equality are manifest. 
 
TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Gross Income Per Employee By Gender 
 
 Women Men  
Gross Income Per Month 
(NIS) 
6,600 9,976 
Gross Income Per Work 
Hour (NIS) 
44 53 
Number of Working 
Hours Per Week 
35.9 44.5 
 
Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a 
 
 
Table 2: A Right to a Family Supplement 
 A family supplement 
right  
No family supplement 
right 
All sectorial collective 55% 45% 
 
117.   Id. at 10. 
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agreements (N = 56) 
Collective agreements in 
the private sector (N = 
38) 
74%*  26% 
Collective agreements in 
the public sector (N=18 ) 
17%** 83% 
El-Al No Yes 
Teva No Yes 
 
*Including five collective agreements that integrated the family supplement 
into the salary. 
**Including one collective agreement that integrated the family supplement 
into the salary. In all the collective agreements in the public sector the supple-
ment might be void. 
 
 
Table 3: A Right to Reduced Working Hours in Israel’s Sectorial  
Collective Agreements 
 Collective agreements 
with flexible working 
hours 
Collective agreements 
without flexible working 
hours 
All sectorial collective 
agreements (N=56) 
30% 70% 
Collective agreements in 
the public sector (N=18) 
94% 6% 
Collective agreements in 
the private sector (N=38) 
____ 100% 
Teva Yes ___ 
El-Al Yes ___ 
 
 
 
Table 4: A right to a “Nursing Hour” 
 Collective agreements 
with ‘nursing hours’ 
Collective agreements 
without ‘nursing hours’ 
All sectorial collective 
agreements (N=56) 
8% 92% 
Collective agreements in 
the public sector (N=18) 
28% 72%* 
Collective agreements in 
the private sector (N=38) 
____ 100% 
Teva Yes ___ 
El-Al Yes ___ 
 
*Most of the workers in the public sector are entitled to a ‘nursing hour’ due 
to the provisions of the Takshir. 
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Table 5: A Right to Day Care Expenditures in Israel’s Sectorial Collective 
Agreements 
 Collective Agreements 
with Day Care Expendi-
tures 
Collective Agreements 
without Day Care Ex-
penditures 
All sectorial collective 
agreements (N=56) 
36% 64% 
Collective agreements in 
the public sector (N=18) 
100% 0 
Collective agreements in 
the private sector 
(N=38) 
5% 95% 
Teva Yes ___ 
El-Al Yes ___ 
 
Table 6: A Right to Day Care Expenditures: For Whom? 
 Day care sub-
sidies for 
mothers only 
Day care 
subsidies for 
mothers and 
for fathers 
(with condi-
tions) 
Equal day 
care subsidies 
No day 
care subsi-
dies 
All collective 
agreements 
(N=56) 
4% 30% 2% 64% 
Collective 
agreements in 
the public sec-
tor (N=18) 
5.5%* 89%** 5.5%*** 0 
Collective 
agreements in 
the private sec-
tor (N=38) 
2.5% 2.5% 0 95% 
Teva Yes   No 
El-Al   Yes No 
 
*Although the nurses’ collective agreement provides the right to mothers 
only, the law and the takshir extend the right towards “family rights”. 
**Although these collective agreements provide a right for mother only (and 
for father with conditions) the law and the takshir extends the rights towards 
“family rights”. 
***The collective agreement with regard to academic staff provides ‘parents 
rights’ and not ‘mothers’ rights’. 
 
